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The American College of Medical Informatics (ACMI) sponsors periodic debates during the American
Medical Informatics Fall Symposium to highlight important informatics issues of broad interest. In
2012, a panel debated the following topic: ‘‘Resolved: Health Information Exchange Organizations Should
Shift Their Principal Focus to Consumer-Mediated Exchange in Order to Facilitate the Rapid Development
of Effective, Scalable, and Sustainable Health Information Infrastructure.’’ Those supporting the proposi-
tion emphasized the need for consumer-controlled community repositories of electronic health records
(health record banks) to address privacy, stakeholder cooperation, scalability, and sustainability. Those
opposing the proposition emphasized that the current healthcare environment is so complex that devel-
opment of consumer control will take time and that even then, consumers may not be able to mediate
their information effectively. While privately each discussant recognizes that there are many sides to this
complex issue, each followed the debater’s tradition of taking an extreme position in order emphasize
some of the polarizing aspects in the short time allotted them. In preparing this summary, we sought
to convey the substance and spirit of the debate in printed form. Transcripts of the actual debate were
edited for clarity, and appropriate supporting citations were added for the further ediﬁcation of the
reader.
Published by Elsevier Inc.1. Introduction exchanges (HIEs). HIEs have been discussed in the biomedical liter-The American College of Medical Informatics (ACMI)1 periodi-
cally sponsors a debate at the AMIA Annual Symposium that focuses
on some informatics topic of national or international import. The
debaters are ACMI fellows who take on the task as an educational
service to the community and attempt to present balanced discus-
sion that may at times be counter to their personal position on the
topic.
This paper is based on a transcript of the session, which has
been edited for clarity and to remove the colloquial language that
is characteristic of oral presentations.
2. Introductory remarks
The topic of the 2012 debate addresses the level of patient
empowerment that is possible and desirable in health informationature since at least 1957 [1]. In the US, work on HIEs began in ear-
nest in the early 2000s, with the primary focus on patient data
exchanges between large healthcare institutions. These initial HIEs
were usually provider-oriented regional arrangements, with very
little patient involvement. However, the US patient empowerment
movement, which began to garner attention in the mid-1970s [2],
gained signiﬁcant inﬂuence with the Health Records Act 1990, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, and
the Data Protection Act of 1998 – all of which addressed the issue
of patient access to their own records.
The topic of the 2012 ACMI debate was ‘‘Resolved: Health Infor-
mation Exchange Organizations Should Shift Their Principal Focus
to Consumer-Mediated Exchange in Order to Facilitate the Rapid
Development of Effective, Scalable, and SustainableHealth Informa-
tion Infrastructure.’’ The ‘‘pro’’ position was argued by Dr. William
Yasnoff, the Managing Partner of National Health Information
Infrastructure Advisors, and Dr. Latanya Sweeney, professor of
Government and Technology in Residence at Harvard University.
The ‘‘con’’ position was argued by Dr. John Halamka, Chief
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School, and Dr. Mark Frisse, the Accenture Professor of Biomedical
Informatics at Vanderbilt University.
The discussion that follows captures the comments of the 2012
debate and is divided into eight segments of presentation and
rebuttal. Additional points are included that were made during a
question-and-answer session with the audience after the debate’s
completion.3. Statement in support of the proposition
William Yasnoff (WY): The subject of this debate is health
information infrastructure, which the 2001 National Committee
on Vital and Health Statistics report, Information for Health, deﬁnes
as ‘‘a comprehensive knowledge-based system capable of provid-
ing information to all who need it to make sound decisions about
health.’’ [3]
The goal of the Health Information Infrastructure is the avail-
ability of comprehensive electronic patient records when and
where needed. The word ‘‘comprehensive’’ is critical because most
of the quality improvement and cost savings that we expect from
Health Information Infrastructure will not come from converting
our current silos of data into digital form, but rather from having
more complete information on patients, particularly at the point
of care. Accordingly, we need both fully electronic health records
(the subject of the HITECH incentives) and a mechanism for aggre-
gating all the records on a given patient in a particular place at a
particular time. The HITECH Act provided over $500 million in
funding to the states for the aggregation task.
According to the Ofﬁce of the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology (ONC), HIE organizations are responsible
for sharing health information electronically in accordance with
nationally recognized standards [4]. When we add the resolu-
tion’s concept of ‘‘consumer-mediated exchange,’’ the result is
what ONC refers to as ‘‘personally controlled health record
platforms.’’ [4]
‘‘Personally controlled’’ means that the consumer requests that
speciﬁc health information be exchanged (this may be a standing
request) and speciﬁes with whom it is to be exchanged. Also, the
consumer may annotate the information, enabling each consumer
to enforce his or her own individual privacy requirements. This is
consistent with the ‘‘download and transmit’’ requirement in
Meaningful Use stage 2.
The resolution’s phrase ‘‘shift their principal focus’’ implies, cor-
rectly, that consumer-mediated exchange is not the current princi-
pal focus. At present, HIEs are generally intended to facilitate
information exchange directly or indirectly from one health care
provider organization to another, typically without the consumer’s
knowledge or approval. In some cases, the consumer may opt out
or opt in to the entire process but beyond that has little or no
control.
Why is this important? Consider the last phrase in the resolu-
tion: ‘‘to facilitate the rapid development of effective, scalable,
and sustainable Health Information Infrastructure.’’
At present, we are not moving rapidly towards this goal. The
PCAST report from December of 2010 said, ‘‘HIE efforts through
the states will not solve the fundamental need for data to be
universally accessed, integrated, and understood while also being
protected.’’ [5] A recent survey of 179 HIEs found that none met
the authors’ deﬁnition of ‘‘comprehensive,’’ and just 13 met Mean-
ingful Use stage 1 criteria. The authors therefore questioned
whether Regional Health Information Organizations (RHIOs) in
their current form can be ‘‘self-sustaining and effective in helping
U.S. physicians and hospitals engage in robust HIE to improve
the quality and efﬁciency of care.’’ [6]The resolution’s use of the word ‘‘scalable’’ means that once
implemented, an HIE should be expandable to larger populations,
and ultimately the whole country. However, since the HIEs are
not currently effective, scaling them would be counterproductive.
By ‘‘sustainable,’’ the resolution implies that ongoing recurrent
revenue should be sufﬁcient to cover operations. The PCAST report
states ‘‘The lack of a clear business case for communities to sustain
HIEs over time remains a daunting challenge.’’ [5] Similarly, the
previously cited HIE survey found only 6, or 3.4 percent, of 179
HIEs were self-reported as sustainable; objective audits might ﬁnd
an even lower rate [6].
Our proposed solution is the creation of consumer-controlled
community repositories of electronic health records, otherwise
known as health record banks (HRBs) [7,8]. This solves the key
problems that are currently plaguing HIEs.
Privacy: Patient control allows each person to establish his or
her own privacy policy. In this large and diverse country, this is
the only privacy policy that every person can agree on.
Stakeholder cooperation: When patients requests their health
care data, all stakeholders must provide such data under HIPAA,
and they must provide them in electronic form, so the result is
comprehensive records. Both privacy and stakeholder cooperation
are essential for effectiveness.
Sustainability: Once you have the information together in one
place under patient control, multiple business models are possible,
operational costs are low and there are many opportunities to cre-
ate value with the information. For example, you could have a
‘‘freemium’’ business model [9], popular on the Internet, in which
there is no cost for basic accounts; revenue comes mostly from
optional apps and anonymized reports for researchers and policy-
makers. Sufﬁcient revenue (shared with the consumer) is gener-
ated to provide ongoing permanent providers with subsidies for
cloud-based electronic health records (EHRs). Note that in this
business model, there is no need to assume or capture any health-
care cost savings.
Practical: Finally, this is practical to implement. Free EHRs can
be offered to physicians in exchange for signing up patients for free
health record bank accounts. This yields truly comprehensive elec-
tronic records through much higher adoption rates and rapid
achievement of critical mass of patients, with a reasonable startup
cost of $5–8 million and scalability through replication in other
communities.
In summary, HIEs today are not on a path to success. By chang-
ing their focus to consumer-mediated HRBs, we can rapidly
achieve an effective, scalable, and sustainable Health Information
Infrastructure that provides comprehensive electronic patient
records when and where needed.4. Rebuttal to Dr. Yasnoff’s statement
John Halamka (JH):We all agree that the goal of ONC is to pro-
vide coordinated care, to improve population health, to measure
public health. However, I will argue against a few of Dr. Yasnoff’s
assertions.
First, do HRBs really exist? Google Health is gone. Uptake of
Microsoft HealthVault is slow and many ﬁnd it that it does not pro-
vide a highly usable experience.
Dr. Yasnoff states that creation of a sustainable, provider-cen-
tric HIE is very challenging. However, In December of 2011 the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) approved fund-
ing for a provider-centric HIE. On October 16th of 2012, we went
live with a fully sustainable provider-centric exchange connecting
5000 providers in the State of Massachusetts. Each agreed to pay
an amount equivalent to the value they would derive from the ex-
change. Interestingly enough, when we did a sensitivity analysis,
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expected the payer and the provider to coordinate care and provide
this kind of function.
Dr. Yasnoff references the PCAST report several times. The
PCAST report essentially contained recommendations related to
three important concepts: provenance of data, metadata describing
patients, and privacy ﬂags. Meaningful Use stage 2 actually incor-
porated those three recommendations into the standards that are
required as part of the certiﬁcation rule. So, in fact, to implement
the PCAST goals, a patient-centric HIE is not required.
The story of my wife’s cancer diagnosis is informative here. She
went to Partners HealthCare, a major Massachusetts health care
delivery system, and received a diagnostic mammogram. That
mammogram illustrated that she had something concerning going
on in her left breast. She wanted to seek further care at another pro-
vider organization, Beth Israel Deaconess. She was told at that time,
that there was no information superhighway in Massachusetts.
She visited the Health Information Management Department of
Partners HealthCare and asked for her electronic record, and she
was told that, for 25 cents a page, she would be getting paper that
she would then drive to her next provider of care to deliver. So, in
fact, HIPAA does not require an electronic copy delivered to the pa-
tient unless the data are in electronic form.
On October 16th, the Massachusetts HIE went live, Governor
Deval Patrick pushed my wife’s electronic record across Partners
HealthCare, Beth Israel Deaconess, Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, a
third-party aggregator of quality data, and a small solo practice
in the western part of the state to prove that, within one year,
we could achieve seamless provider-to-provider exchange, pro-
tecting privacy, and do it in a sustainable fashion.
So, in response to the resolution, we have an example of a rap-
idly developed, effective, scalable and sustainable HIE that did not
require shifting to a consumer-mediated approach.5. Statement opposing the proposition
Mark Frisse (MF): In taking rather polarizing perspectives on
the proposition, our primary goal is to understand the important
perspectives and questions that help frame the privacy debate.
We want to do so in a way that will help individuals and society
ﬁnd the means by which information technology can be used in
a manner consistent with expectations about the management of
very personal information. This is a challenging task.
Privacy is not an add-on to technology or policy. It cannot
always simply be layered on top of a database or appended to
policies. It is a pervasive issue that touches on economics, philoso-
phy, our notions of personal justice, and a wide range of other
factors that are not often brought up systematically in scientiﬁc
proceedings. Privacy is at the core of the matter. It is central to
every personal transaction among individuals or organizations.
Although these issues extend into every aspect of modern life,
we restrict our argument to privacy of health information. There
are many reasons why we have disagreements, and I am going to
go through some of these in an effort to respond to Dr. Yasnoff’s
points.
We can begin by understanding that technology is necessary
but not sufﬁcient for enforcing medical privacy expectations.
Through an ONC-funded project and other efforts, my associates
and I have been trying explicitly to encode policies and laws into
logical statements that can, in turn, lead to executable code oper-
ating on health data. These efforts are challenging and critical to
the informatics agenda, yet with the exception of work reported
in a few papers in JAMIA and a few conference proceedings, privacy
seems to be an orphan in the ﬁeld of biomedical informatics. I be-
lieve that both consent and privacy policy enforcement arefoundations for accountable care, data sharing, and every other
activity essential to a trusted learning healthcare system.
Health information exchanges as organizations were an early
testing ground for accommodating privacy preferences. I partici-
pated in the creation of such an enterprise in Memphis, Tennessee.
Our data sharing agreements and privacy policies were based on
contemporary documents from the Markle Foundation’s Connect-
ing for Health Initiative. We found that trust was essential and that
addressing issues of secondary use or exceptions – including some
required by recent federal rules – would have been problematic.
In the Memphis exchange, we found that about one percent of
the patients chose to opt out. What was ironic to me was we have
all this debate about privacy protection, but when patients in
Memphis opted out of our newly created clinical health informa-
tion exchange, I fear these individuals thought they were opting
out of every use of their data. Opting out of the health information
exchange did not prevent many downstream uses of health data
that were bought and sold on commercial markets. Opting out,
therefore, is an incomplete remedy for assuring the realization of
one’s privacy expectations.
Change takes time. What seems impossible or impractical at
one instant may later become commonplace. Emerging technolo-
gies often require ﬁve or more years for buyers and sellers to
understand their value before they can become incorporated into
a market. Many retrospective expert analyses raise despair about
the ﬁnancial viability of health information exchange activities.
But similar pessimistic predictions have been made about the tele-
graph, the telephone, personal computers, and almost every other
disruptive innovation that now plays a prominent role in our lives.
Admittedly, many state health information exchanges are not
getting traction, but other models – particularly those based on
clinically integrated networks, accountable care organizations,
and other forms of collaboration – are incorporating many princi-
ples that make them, functionally, health information exchanges.
Currently, organizations are less focused on regional or statewide
exchanges and far more focused on the latter forms I have men-
tioned. Each of these forms requires the same attention to personal
privacy protection and policy enforcement.
I now turn my attention the speciﬁc terms used in the
proposition.
Shift: One may suspect that ‘‘shift’’ implies a gradual and evolu-
tionary change. But sometimes dramatic and abrupt shifts force
change that taxes cultural norms. Examples of such shifts would
include the introduction of accountable care organizations, post-
discharge care coordination programs, meaningful use standards,
and many other external factors that provide new incentives for
parties to exchange information. Perhaps things will shift entirely
into the approach promulgated by the proponents. I would wel-
come such a change if it were emergent and not yet-another top-
down mandate. But I do not think things can move quickly and
therefore the proposition very much depends on what we mean
about the rate of change implied by the word ‘‘shift.’’
Consumer-mediated: The deﬁnition of ‘‘consumer’’ is elusive.
Is a consumer the same as a patient? Are the preferences of con-
sumers or patients static? I suspect not, because when one receives
care regularly within a healthcare system, one’s behavior changes.
As one passes through phases of serious or chronic illness, prefer-
ences made while healthy may no longer apply. My family is cur-
rently on such a journey facing a terminal illness in someone we
love greatly. Most of what we believed prior to this crisis was
thrown out the window. Our understanding and preferences
change as a result of what we experience.
As you know, in ‘‘informed consent’’ people do not really quite
knowwhat they are consenting to. Efforts to simulate future events
– through videos or other means – might help with medical in-
formed consent and with a realistic view of medical privacy. Can
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implications of them doing so? How do I change my preferences
and assure that my change repudiates past privacy preferences?
At best, our complex healthcare delivery and ﬁnancing systems
create a labyrinth of data in which the fate of our personal health
information often cannot be discerned.
Rapid: As Dr. Halamka says, you can build different forms of
health information organizations or different forms of health infor-
mation exchanges among trusted participants almost immediately.
Indeed, I can argue exchange that takes place any time my physi-
cian is asked to fax a portion of my medical record with my con-
sent. The fax, like other common means of communication, may
be rapid but fax patterns are not accountable; individuals cannot
easily obtain a trace of where their data were sent and for what
purposes. A consumer-mediated approach would alleviate that
concern, but such introductions would not be widely adopted rap-
idly. Innovation can happen only so quickly. Culture trumps both
strategy and good intentions. The key to ‘‘rapid’’ has more to do
with public perception and participation than it does with
proclamation.
Scalable: Scalability depends on how components are orga-
nized and how they are used. I would argue that many health
information exchange propositions based on highly-granular con-
sent methods are so complex that they will collapse under their
own weight. Instances where they do not might be due to individ-
uals entrusting the management of their health information to one
or more third parties. This may add scalability but it also adds com-
plexity. If one wants to trust a third party, one’s primary-care prac-
titioner might be the ideal candidate; this is the argument made by
Dr. Halamka.
Sustainable: The idea here is to monetize information and the
arguments in favor of this are plausible. But the pace at which sus-
tainability can be reached is not certain. There remains an oppor-
tunity for fraud and theft. It will take time and carefully studied
pilots to see if the proponents’ approach meets societal
expectations.
I agree with their motivation but it is difﬁcult for me to be cer-
tain that organizations combine policies, technology, informatics,
and economics to assure trust. Drawing on Helen Nissenbaum’s ap-
proach [10], I would take the view that it is not so much who owns
my data, but whether the use of my data is consistent with per-
sonal expectations or social norms. It is not a matter of collection;
cameras are everywhere. It is not a matter of aggregation; some
aggregation is in the public interest. Rather, it is potential misuse
of our incredible ability to collect and aggregate data.
I would also argue that wemust not address only privacy rights;
we must address our responsibilities to be accountable for health
care services that we use but for which we do not pay. Most of
us do not pay for our entire health care. Others pay for it. All of
us – including me – have some accountability to rationalize how
healthcare dollars are spent. For example, if I have active tubercu-
losis, I do not like the idea that it is my libertarian right to just
cough all over you and nobody needs to intervene. Our privacy
rights are bounded by social responsibilities, but these responsibil-
ities vary across organizations, across the country, and across the
world.
Finally, I ask again whether the alternative proposed by the Pro-
ponents is tractable; does it really meet the desired ends? Is it self-
contradictory? Do we have any faith at all that such a dramatic
reframing will not bring promising healthcare technology efforts
to a grinding halt? And so, like Dr. Halamka, I tend to favor a broad-
er consumer role but in the context of privacy and provider-
mediated exchanges. I would like to see more ﬂexibility, but in
the general case, I think the vast majority of people would just like
to tweak the system, clip off the tails, and do nothing more.6. Rebuttal to Dr. Frisse’s statement
WY: First, I would like to address speciﬁcally what Dr. Halamka
said about HIPAA and electronic copies, repeating a very common
myth. Having worked in the ofﬁce at the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) that wrote the HIPAA regulation, I want to
reference the text of Section 164.524(c)(2)(i) of the original privacy
rule that addresses patients requesting their records: ‘‘The covered
entity must provide the individual with access to the protected
health information in the form or format requested by the individ-
ual, if it is readily producible in such form or format.’’ Under Mean-
ingful Use, it is readily producible if there are electronic records,
and therefore, it must be electronic. The idea that one can respond
to a HIPAA request with paper if there are electronic records is not
consistent with the regulation.
Second, just because this approach has already failed in certain
cases does not mean the idea of health record banks is not viable.
Certainly, Google Health failed. However, Google Health had four
key problems:
Trust: Who is going to trust Google with their health records?
National scope: National scope interferes with obtaining a crit-
ical mass of records needed for value, because having a small frac-
tion of someone’s medical records has no value. For example,
having 50 percent of a patient’s medication history has no value.
A provider must still ask the patient about medications.
EHR subsidies: Google failed to address the need for EHR sub-
sidies to ensure the data are electronic: Even if Google or Micro-
soft’s HealthVault had the capability to access every piece of
electronic data in the country, it would not necessarily be helpful
because most of the data are still on paper.
Business model: Google’s business model for Google Health
was the same as the business model for Google itself, which is
based on revenue from advertising. While some people will be
looking at their records in a health record bank, mostly people will
not.
All these issues can all be addressed with a more effective
health record bank model.
Our distinguished colleagues assert that the model we are pro-
posing is unproven. While we agree, the HIE model that is being
pursued today has been disproven. After years of work, it has failed
repeatedly. It failed in Santa Barbara, CareSpark in Tennessee, in
Pennsylvania, California, and other locations. The landscape is lit-
tered with failures. Very few are even partially successful, and even
Judy Murphy’s wonderful keynote yesterday, which presented a
very optimistic assessment of what was going on, showed statistics
indicating that very little data are actually being exchanged [11]. If
there were a proven solution, we would not be having this discus-
sion. As a consequence, we must by deﬁnition try something that is
unproven.
Sustainability: Health record banks may be operated at very
low cost, $6–$8 per person per year, and have multiple revenue
sources including apps, advertising, and anonymized reports with
permission for reuse. HIEs have no established long-term business
model to deliver comprehensive information, and those very few
HIEs that are sustainable in their current form are not delivering
comprehensive information. What about the idea that patients will
not pay for apps? It is true that no one has proven that patients will
pay for these kinds of apps. However, according to Mobclix, the
average cellphone user is generating $17 per month in revenue
from apps [12]. Our estimate is that just $16 a year in revenue
per person is sufﬁcient to operate a health record bank. One exam-
ple is a ‘‘peace of mind’’ app: if a patient’s health record bank ac-
count is accessed by an emergency physician, the patient’s loved
ones are immediately notiﬁed. I believe most people will gladly
pay $20/year for this.
J.J. Cimino et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 48 (2014) 5–15 9The PCAST solution: The PCAST solution of metadata tagging
has serious problems. Once you add metadata tags with privacy
preferences, assuming the data can somehow protect themselves
when they are released (which is dubious), these preferences can-
not be changed. Furthermore, the idea that such a digital rights
management (DRM) approach would work with medical records
really does not stand up to the test of reality. DRMwas tried unsuc-
cessfully with music and movies. In each of those domains, there is
just one data type and one permission. Medical records are much
too complicated for DRM.
Assuring comprehensive records: A key problem with HIEs is
that they do not force stakeholder cooperation. In contrast, health
record banks accomplish this through the involvement of the pa-
tients. HIEs also do not force all the records to be electronic. Even
the most optimistic estimates of EHR penetration indicate only 50
percent physician adoption by 2014 or 2015, which clearly does
not result in fully electronic information.7. Statement supporting the proposition
Latanya Sweeney (LS): Dr. Halamka mentioned Massachusetts,
so let me start by saying that my team is also in Massachusetts and
has interviewedmembers of the Google Health team. Relying on an
eyes-on-page business case is one of the reasons Google Health
failed; most people do not visit their health information frequently.
We have introduced a new research project called MyDataCan
that helps individuals manage access to their own personal data.
The goal is not just to capture health data but to focus on providing
apps that use data across all the silos of personal health informa-
tion. We want a person to be able to improve his life using his
own data. In order to do so, a person needs access to the full spec-
trum of his personal information.
My colleagues at MIT and Northeastern have already shown
some dramatic results combining personal health information with
ﬁnancial and phone data, for example. MyDataCan also promises
long-term sustainability. As Dr. Yasnoff pointed out, something
on the order of $16 a year in app revenues per user should be suf-
ﬁcient to sustain the system; this amount seems nominal.
Efforts like MyDataCan can also help in sharing personal health
information for many worthy purposes. In fact, consumer-medi-
ated (or patient-mediated) exchanges of personal health informa-
tion, like MyDataCan, resolve the very trust issues that HIEs
cannot resolve themselves. I will quickly review six of these issues.
Provider liability: A primary goal of an HIE is to support the re-
use of test results, because doing so could eliminate unnecessary
duplicate testing and thereby reduce cost. To accomplish this, the
source of the test result must be reputable. The image cannot be
modiﬁed. The results must be accurate and associated with the
correct patient. We already certify laboratory test results and the
experts who source these reports. We can have them use digital
signatures to preserve the integrity of the contents to verify they
are being sourced from the expert or laboratory, but the complica-
tion of provider liability remains. Credentials are not the same as
trustworthy relationships. If a provider acts on the results she gets
from an HIE, even in part, she increases her malpractice liability.
Providers tend to trust speciﬁc experts and laboratory tests based
on personal and professional relationships. When a provider acces-
ses results from an HIE, the information on which she will base
decisions may be derived from relatively unknown experts.
Now consider consumer-mediated exchange. When a patient
grants electronic access to his digitally signed test results, the pro-
vider reduces her liability because the patient now attests that
these are the digitally signed results and decisions made by the
provider based on the results is borne in part by the patient. In
summary, HIEs can introduce errors and chain of custody problemsthat increase the malpractice liability of providers; under patient
mediation, this liability goes away.
Data correctness: There are variations in the design of HIEs, but
fundamentally, an HIE passes health data from one party to an-
other, such as from a laboratory to a provider, from a hospital to
a provider, and so on. Some designs hold the data centrally, and
others merely move the data between repositories. A critical prob-
lem in all these HIE designs is propagating corrections or updated
information. A provider cannot know whether she is working with
old or incorrect data that were subsequently corrected at their
source or elsewhere. Suppose Dr. Alice writes a prescription for a
patient. The information forwards to the HIE. Dr. Bob, the special-
ist, downloads the prescription information as part of his involve-
ment in the patient’s care. When the patient arrives at the
pharmacy, the pharmacist communicates with Dr. Alice about a
drug interaction problem, and Dr. Alice verbally agrees to the chan-
ged prescription. The original prescription that forwarded on to the
HIE is now incorrect. If the updated prescription forwards, it would
likely append to the information, appearing as a second prescrip-
tion not replacing the ﬁrst.
Now consider consumer-mediated exchange. Because the
patient is the focal point of information collection and sharing,
updates and corrections can be proactively promulgated to those
active in his treatment. There is no need to send update notices to
all prior data recipients, only to those active in his care, and the
information can be provided and reviewed for just-in-time care
decisions. In summary, HIEs do not propagate updated information
or notiﬁcations of changes to earlier recipients of data, and if an HIE
were to do so, it would risk ending up with multiple unresolved
entries. But under a patient-centered model, corrected information
resolves locally and is efﬁciently shared.
Identity management: An HIE has to match patient informa-
tion automatically from many sources. Knowing to which patient
a piece of information refers is difﬁcult. At ﬁrst glance, you might
think Social Security numbers are the answer because each patient
should have one. But not everyone covered may have a Social Secu-
rity number and insurance companies often associate the Social
Security number of the primary policyholder to others listed on
the same policy. This makes Social Security numbers unreliable
in family member medical records.
Using names and dates of birth to resolve family members can
cause collisions because names and dates of births (among twins
and multiple births) within families are not necessarily unique.
HIEs tend to use ad hoc schemes based on combinations of names,
addresses, and birthdays, without actually knowing whether the
combination they request is sufﬁciently unique or accounting for
the temporal nature of address changes.
Now consider consumer-mediated exchange. Information orga-
nized by the patient allows the patient to disambiguate and identify
which piece of information belongs to whom and to signal about
missing data. In summary, HIEs may mismatch data to patients,
but under patient mediation, patients can help in these situations
by vetting data as accurately belonging or as being missing.
Data segmentation: HIEs are required by law to segment some
forms of data that the law considers sensitive. An example is HIV
status. The intent of the law is to provide patients with some addi-
tional privacy protection by sequestering speciﬁc data. It operates
under the belief that not every provider needs to know all of the
patient’s information, so the law dictates which information is so
sensitive that it must be segmented from the rest. The complica-
tion for an HIE is knowing what data to suppress or segment, be-
cause other data can lead to the inference of what was supposed
to have been suppressed by law.
For example, suppose we do not want to reveal that a person
has HIV, so we might suppress the diagnosis of AIDS. Then after
some thought, we might realize we should also suppress the
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information that may imply the patient has HIV? For example,
the specialties of his doctors or the appearance of a pattern of spe-
ciﬁc tests can also imply a patient has HIV, and those combinations
of information may not be redacted. Locating all items that could
lead to such inferences is difﬁcult, and missing them may leak
information and thereby increase liability.
Now consider consumer-mediated exchange. Allowing a patient
to select what information he wants to sequester not only im-
proves his satisfaction, since any two people may not agree on
which pieces of information are sensitive, but also leaves the infer-
ence problem to the patient, which is beneﬁcial because what a pa-
tient decides to share is ﬁne by law. A patient does not have to
enforce segmentation requirements. If a patient decides to with-
hold critical information for his care, then the provider has no lia-
bility. In summary, HIEs are required by law to segment sensitive
data, but under patient mediation, patients can make independent
sharing decisions.
Data completeness: A promise of HIEs is to use consolidated
information over time and across providers to improve medical
decision-making for the patient. When presenting a medical time-
line for a patient, how does a provider know whether the HIE pre-
sentation of history is missing information? The consequences to
patients can be devastating.
For example, a 24-year-old woman, Eve, sees Dr. Faye after her
obstetrician noted a murmur on a prenatal examination in her 21st
week of pregnancy. She denies any symptoms and reports no
history of allergies. The HIE delivers prior medical information
for Eve that reports a ﬁlled pharmacy prescription for penicillin
with no other encounters until the pregnancy.
Dr. Faye recommends an endocarditis prophylaxis and pre-
scribes Biocef, to be taken orally. Life-threatening complications
result because Eve did not remember, and Dr. Faye did not know,
that Eve has a penicillin allergy with an immediate hypersensitiv-
ity reaction even though the HIE summary included a prior pre-
scription for penicillin. What was missing was a visit to the
emergency room shortly after the penicillin prescription was ﬁlled.
In summary, HIEs cannot know what they do not know. Under a
patient centered model, patients can review and comment on data,
including missing data and patients have a vested interest in doing
so.
Sharing data beyond the patient’s care: The business model to
sustain most HIEs remains uncertain. The most likely possibility is
the sale of patient data to generate revenues. If so, this will cause a
dramatic increase in the risk of economic harms to individuals.
Worse, there is no way of knowing to whom an HIE gave or sold
data. Virtually no HIE is a government entity, and therefore one
cannot even issue a Freedom of Information request to know to
whom data were given or sold. Examples of the nature and harms
of hidden data sharing can be viewed at theDataMap.org. This
website attempts to document all the places patient information
ﬂows and identiﬁes resulting risks and harms to individuals. The
depiction of data sharing before and after the promulgation of
HIPAA reveals a dramatic increase in sharing, while the results of
re-identiﬁcation experiments exposes the risks. With HIEs coming
on board, industry experts estimate the sale of patient information
to be a $2 billion market this year, and growing to $10 billion with-
in 5 years.
In summary, data sharing with HIEs is hidden from patients
who can suffer real harms from the sharing. Under a patient-
centered model, patients are involved in sharing and can therefore
know to whom data are shared or sold, making potential harms
more transparent.8. Rebuttal to Dr. Sweeny’s statement
MF: HIE is a verb, not a noun. It is an economic model. It is an
exchange between buyers and sellers. It is an immature market.
It is all churning and changing; reviews critical of HIEs should
not be taken as the ﬁnal word about the need for data exchange.
I will accept that the HIE organizational form as we have generally
seen it has failed. But to dismiss exchange completely would be
throwing out the baby with the bathwater. HIE is fundamentally
different today. HIE, as the verb, is a foundation for accountable
care organizations, clinically integrated networks, and many
means of interacting with clinicians, patients, and health plans.
That is HIE today.
Not only is it important to think about this new market and
opportunity, it is important to exchange both clinical and adminis-
trative data. Exchanging only clinical data is a bit of a Potemkin
village and risks ignoring the use – and misuse – of administrative
data. So much of how we use data is driven by costs, beneﬁts, and
simple economics. The health record banks may be a good way to
achieve our common aims.
I would like now to return to the points in Dr. Sweeney’s
statement.
Provider liability: Provider liability can be addressed. Most of
the providers I know honor even more rigidly their Hippocratic
Oath in exchange for a more complete data set to ensure proper
care. No matter how we manage privacy, we must bring more
information to the point of care and ensure that providers no long-
er have to ﬂy in the dark.
Data correctness: Propagating corrections to data is compli-
cated. It is not clear how we can assure such propagation, even
with a consumer-mediated exchange.
Identity management:We built our HIE system in Memphis so
that clinicians could disambiguate identities by associating every
data item with a speciﬁc demographic proﬁle. But we encountered
only vanishingly small numbers of data matching problems. Every
argument that my opponent has made is a valid argument, but
there are other ways of addressing each of these within our current
system while we try to evolve to a greater patient-directed
presence.
Data segmentation: Letusgoback to theHippocraticOathand the
preferences for practitioners to have access to more data but to trust
them to honor privacy concerns. Segmentation may help with some
of the anonymization issues and mitigate risks of re-identiﬁcation.
In my view the challenge of re-identiﬁcation always exists, and
certainly in the general exchange setting, every text report may
conceal within it something that would be held private in a data
segmentation approach. I advise that unless one is certain of the
use of text reports, if one wants to protect any secret, one should
simply try to opt out of everything – or simply trust the providers
who have access to PHI.
Data completeness: Patients can make errors too! I can articu-
late preferences that are not really what I wanted to have done. Our
preferences change as our circumstance and understanding change.
You cannot possibly understand what you are getting into when
you are a consumer until you become a patient facing a serious ill-
ness. When you become a patient, you may not have the necessary
clarity of mind to alter your privacy preferences. At these times, one
must rely on the concept of the trusted intermediary again.
Sharing data beyond the patient’s care: Data monetization is
an enormous issue where boundaries are necessary. There are lim-
its that we all agree upon – some reasonable use of our medical
data. It is the extremes, such as the secret use of our data, that
disturb. I therefore like Dr. Sweeney’s most recent project, where
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that tells us where the individual’s information goes. A compre-
hensive understanding of this idea would advance the public
debate.
But as long as I am expecting my health care to be paid for by
somebody else, I have an obligation to provide ﬁduciaries with
some access to my data. In one sense, I am monetizing my own
data in that I proﬁt by receiving coverage I do not directly pay
for. I am getting a good deal in that. If I buy more of something
(such as a redundant test) because I think that it is good for me,
again, I should in some way be accountable. My patterns will not
be known if someone in authority does not know what I am doing
with resources. I should not be able just to opt out of that
accountability.
But, if I am a libertarian and paying for it all, then that is a dif-
ferent argument. We have tried to honor this spirit in the new laws
where services delivered but paid for in cash do not require disclo-
sure. Technically, this is a challenge to implement through current
hospital systems technologies.
It is not simply that our health care system is dysfunctional
(which it is). It is not so much that it is hard to navigate inside that
dysfunctional health care system. It is broader than any current
care-delivery approach. If we do not address the fundamental eco-
nomics – if we do not align the public responsibility as a social
good – the problem will persist.
What will exchange look like in the near future? I envision
‘‘clouds’’ of ACOs and clinically integrated networks, where there
is a very tight trust of ﬁnancial necessity with wide patient con-
sent. How these clouds communicate is the issue. Perhaps the
health record bank can serve as such an intermediary, assuring
us of control when we migrate out of our normal care circum-
stances. I am merely arguing that this model is not the only ap-
proach. There are many ways of addressing these issues and I
believe we will see an evolution over the next decade. I simply be-
lieve that an abrupt and radical change is inconsistent with usual
societal behaviors.9. Statement opposing the proposition
JH: I actually completely agree with Dr. Yasnoff and Dr. Sweeney
that I love the idea of patient-mediated exchange. From a privacy
perspective, it is an excellent idea. Patient Centricity is what ONC
wants and what we are working toward.
But remember the question that we are asked is about rapid
development. I argue that development of patient-mediated ex-
changes will not be accomplished rapidly. Identity management
on 300 million people is challenging. Imagine the challenge of issu-
ing digital certiﬁcates to every citizen and identity-prooﬁng every
citizen. Providers are already dubious about HIE in general. If I tell
them the patient is now going to receive the data, apply privacy
preferences, and then forward the data, my providers will say,
‘‘Hmm, there is a non-repudiated liability issue. Did they change
the Tylenol No. 3 to Oxycontin?’’ We agree that patient centricity
is a goal; ensuring data integrity will be required. As I mentioned,
there is a lack of current products to support consumer-mediated
exchange. We all hope that there are going to be mobile, modular,
‘‘datapaloozas’’ to fuel new products that run on your iPhone that
do this, but such products do not exist yet.
We certainly found in our Massachusetts experience that it is
easier to start with entity- or organizational-level exchange rather
than individual-level exchange. When my wife’s record went from
Partners HealthCare to Beth Israel Deaconess, there were only two
certiﬁcates and two network nodes involved, because it was orga-
nization to organization. Now, obviously, once it arrived at the
organization, internal processes put the record in association withthe right patient. But think about the ease of doing what I just said:
two nodes, two certiﬁcates, as opposed to 300 million identities to
be managed. I would argue, as would my colleagues in the EHR
industry, that today’s EHRs are designed for provider-to-provider
data sharing. They are not yet creating this notion of an EHR going
directly to a patient. So the products we have in place at the mo-
ment are more amenable to a provider–provider exchange. I will
give four speciﬁc reasons why provider exchange can be developed
more rapidly.
Simplicity: In Massachusetts, we recognized that of our about
20,000 providers, 5000 were afﬁliated with large organizations
such as Partners Healthcare and Lahey Clinic. We contracted with
a ﬁrm to build an appliance that is connected to the network and
offers six simple ways of getting information: Secure File Transfer
Protocol (SFTP), copying over shared network drive, Representa-
tional State Transfer (REST), Health Level 7 (HL7), Transmission
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) and Simple Object
Access Protocol (SOAP). This did not require any reengineering of
existing EHR products to do provider-to-provider exchange. Our
trust fabric was simple. We hired Symantec to do certiﬁcate issu-
ance and revocation on the major provider-entity organizations
in Massachusetts. This turned out to involve 5000 providers in
big organizations. When we included the midsize organizations
and a couple of small practices, we needed about 500 certiﬁcates
to cover the whole state with 7 million patients.
Provider-mediated exchanges already exist: You can cite the
early examples of Santa Barbara, but that is like saying that in
1874, the automobile did not work very well. But now we are driv-
ing Priuses. Ashish Jha published a paper in which he reviewed
every existing HIE in the country [6] and concluded that there is
an amazing rise of private HIE because of the need for accountable
care organizations. Global capitated risk is forcing the creation of
fully sustainable, rapidly developed, provider-to-provider ex-
change. As Dr. Frisse said, we now are seeing a realignment of
incentives to do the exchange. People are incented to share data.
We have examples in Massachusetts and Indiana. There are some
public HIEs that are working very well and are sustainable, but
the real rise of the private, provider-based HIE seems to be the
trend.
Policy: How do we send data from place to place today? There
is a great deal of paper and faxing. How do we actually handle that
from a policy perspective? We ask patients to sign a consent to dis-
close, and then we push their data in some – usually nonelectronic
– way. Provider-to-provider exchange in Massachusetts actually
just replaces the fax machine with a set of network operations. It
did not require any policy change. In fact, it did not really require
any workﬂow change. All we did was disconnect the fax machine
and put an appliance in its place. It already exists. Policy does need
to be changed.
Stewardship: Existing EHRs and PHRs support collecting data
from across endpoints in the community in what I will call the
patient-centeredmedical electronic home. At Beth Israel-Deaconess,
I can aggregate and normalize information and place it in the
patient’s PHR for him or her to view. We have achieved great satis-
faction by taking data from multiple sources and giving them to
the patient to view without requiring patients to be the stewards
of their own data.
Let me tell you a story about my mother, who consented to re-
lease her medication information to you. She recently broke her
hip in a fall in Los Angeles. I found that the hospital had placed
her on 22 medications when in fact she takes only two. I asked
‘‘As a provider, can I have her medication list, so I can correct
it?’’ They said, ‘‘No. We want to be very patient-centric. We need
your mother to consent and be the steward of her own data trans-
mission.’’ But wait! She has been given 22 medications, and her
mental status is completely altered. She cannot be the steward of
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ment and convince them that provider-to-provider exchange was
the only way around this policy quandary. Ultimately, I discontin-
ued all of her medications, and within 12 hours, she was back to
being able to be the steward of her own data.
I tell you this because I believe patient-centric, consumer-
mediated exchange is good but that it is just not going to work in
all circumstances. It will not be the preference of all individuals
and there are going to be many cases where the individual cannot
be the steward. So we should do both. I would argue that
provider-centric exchangewill be faster andwill get to a foundation
with provider-centric exchange that will enable the consumer-
mediated exchange.10. Rebuttal to Dr. Halamka’s statement
LS: The idea that someone is not able to make decisions, is obvi-
ously taken care of in MyDataCan and other projects like it, and can
even be done by the same mechanisms. One can go to case man-
agement to can get overriding cooperation.
One point mentioned several times has been that we want the
exchange to be available now. MyDataCan is operational right
now and can grow easily. It did not take ten years to get here; it
took ten months. It did not require tens of millions of government
dollars, and I have 1200 physicians who would be happy to sign on
if it were operational in their community. We are getting dramatic
approval for patient control because it solves many problems
quickly and easily.
Dr. Halamka raised the issue of information-hiding by patients.
By having the source of the information digitally sign the informa-
tion, we are guaranteed that the contents are not modiﬁed. A
patient can annotate information, but cannot change the original
content. Different models of these systems may have different fea-
tures. In comparison, let me point out that patients already hide
information from physicians. In two national surveys conducted
by the California HealthCare Foundation, 13–17 percent of all
patients admitted to information-hiding behaviors [13].
With respect to private HIEs, there are serious problems with
sharing information beyond the care of the patient. HIE business
models often rely on the sale of patient data. As I mentioned ear-
lier, virtually no HIE is actually a government entity, and therefore
one cannot issue a request even to know to whom data were given
or sold. Together, the lack of transparency and accountability poses
a dangerous problem for individuals who can suffer economic
losses. There is also no incentive for HIEs to work with each other.
They just become larger silos of patient data. No longer will the
largest silos be hospitals, they will be regional HIEs.
With respect to liability, such questions are reduced or elimi-
nated with patient-controlled access. The liability of MyDataCan,
the HIE, or some other entity is the same, so the real difference is
pushing decision-making and access control to the patient. Doing
so reduces liability.
Dr. Halamka mentioned trust. There is less trust needed for a
system like a health record bank or a MyDataCan approach than
is needed for an HIE because individuals are already making deci-
sions. Since they are a part of the process, consent is implied. I
agree that these models are not completely competitive with HIEs.
They just seem better, and less prone to failure than HIEs. We can
continue to struggle with these decade-old designs for HIEs, but
with today’s technology, we have an opportunity to rethink them
and do it right.
In summary, I would emphasize the following points:
Patients have more in the game, and we should leverage that. It
is their health and their life. We should use that to offset the prob-
lems that we have seen in HIEs.There is a problem of data correction. HIEs cannot reliably prop-
agate changes, but a patient-centered model can proactively notify
others of changes and can make sure the information presented to
a provider is the most accurate.
There is the issue of identity management. Ad hoc guesses to
match pieces of information to the right person are fraught with
perils, but we can actually leverage individuals to vet their data
and alert to missing data.
There is the issue of data segmentation. Federal law requires
that some kinds of medical facts be protected. Doing so is actually
extremely difﬁcult, if not impossible, to implement through auto-
mated means, but turning certain tasks over to the patient allows
ﬁne-grain personal decision-making and the patient assumes the
risk.
There is the issue of data completeness. Missing information
can have dire results in the HIE model, but in the patient-centered
model, patients can spot missing information and provide incom-
plete data with verbal annotation.
Lastly, there is the issue of sharing patient information beyond
the care of the patient. Privately operating HIEs engage in data
sharing that is hidden from patients, even though the patient can
suffer serious economic harms. In the patient-centered model,
the patient has knowledge of, and is a party to, the data sharing.
11. Question and answer period
The above debate concluded with a question-and-answer peri-
od. Most of the questions from the audience were not captured
verbatim in the session recording and have been paraphrased here.
Participants are identiﬁed where possible and in those cases have
approved the text of their questions and comments provided.
Attendee: What business models have been successful for
HIEs?
JH: In Massachusetts, we looked at the value proposition to the
stakeholders, including providers (especially those in global capi-
tated risk contracts) and payers who had manual processes in
which case managers were driving to hospitals to look at records.
These stakeholders found a value proposition in getting data elec-
tronically. The cost of an appliance is about $8000. We charged
BlueCross $27,000 and we charged the big provider organizations
two or three times the cost of the appliance, so that the smaller
provider groups could get appliance for $1000. Patients did not
perceive any value so, in our view the payers, the providers, and
the trusted third parties had value-added services. We never, ever
sell patient data to anyone, so that was not part of our model.
WY: There are many business models possible. The business
model we are suggesting with apps assumes that many patients
will not pay anything for any apps. If only a reasonable fraction
of patients pay for a reasonable number of apps, which is all volun-
tary and optional, enough revenue is generated to pay for the sys-
tem for everybody. To put the cost in perspective, our estimates are
that a bank will cost $6 per person per year at scale, and the cost of
providing cloud-based EHRs for every outpatient physician is $10
per patient per year. So, for $16 per person per year, a health record
bank can be operated. That is less than 0.2% of health care costs per
person – a very modest amount.
Here is another perspective. The average cellphone bill in this
country is $47. The cost of a health record bank is on the average
a little bit over $1 a month, and the beneﬁts from having compre-
hensive electronic patient information available when and where
needed is probably worth more than that. I think this business
model would be a relatively painless way to get patients to pay
for a health record bank without requiring every patient to pay
for it.
There are certain apps that the health plans would sponsor. For
example, an app called Prevention Advisor would deliver reminders
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tient actually gets the recommended care. It would be in the inter-
est of payers to fund such an app, which is a better way of delivering
value than insisting that the payers provide up front ﬁnancial
support.
Attendee: How active are patients once they sign up for
MyDataCan?
LS: If a patient is not active at all, it is exactly the same as an
HIE. So, in other words, if the data are missing and they do not
say, ‘‘My data are missing,’’ then you did not gain any of the bene-
ﬁts on it. But also you do not lose anything. Whatever bar the HIE
sets, you just guarantee the opportunity to be better than that bar,
rather than to say, ‘‘I need everybody to be on top of their data,’’
because not everybody is going to be on top of their data.
At Harvard, we are experiencing a very slow rollout for several
reasons. The people who are currently using MyDataCan are pri-
marily college students who do not have much interest in medical
information, because most of them are not particularly ill. But they
are really interested in the kinds of things that they are able to
learn from their medical data when they cross it with other things,
like prediction. One app from MIT predicts severity of illness over
time based on diet. If it notices from your GPS data that you keep
eating at a fast food restaurant, it says ‘‘that is really not a good
idea.’’ I am trivializing; it is actually far more interesting and
sophisticated, but the point is that people are ﬁnding many uses
for their data. So far, the young 20-somethings who are using
MyDataCan are very excited about it and are very active.
MF: One of the challenges to continued active use is alignment
of incentives. Using Dr. Sweeney’s example, when you drive a car
safely, you get a discount. If you were to eat safely, how about a
safe eating discount on your health insurance? Alas, we do not
have such a thing. So people can go to a fast food restaurant and
smoke and do all kinds of horrible things, and they do not recog-
nize the consequence. It is because of this lack of ‘‘skin in the
game’’ that we have only seen about 25 percent adoption of PHRs.
WY: While we all agree that we would like to see all patients
active in their health and in their medical care, and to access and
be involved in their records, it is not going to happen anytime soon.
It may never happen.
A key advantage of the health record bank model is that all pa-
tients have to do is sign up and check off the default consents,
which allow all their information to be available to all their current
providers. In this way, even if they never do anything else, they still
get the beneﬁt from their information being collected and being
available to all their providers; there can be huge beneﬁts without
any patient engagement.
Of course, patient engagement is great, and health record banks
certainly facilitate patient engagement. Patients can check and
interact with their records, but the basic beneﬁts are not depen-
dent on such engagement. People are busy and are not likely to
pay much attention to such systems. All the available data show
that we are not going to get huge majorities of patients active in
their personal health records anytime soon. Nevertheless, health
record banks can still provide a beneﬁt.
Attendee (Charles P. Friedman): Do HIEs have consent issues
that differ from those in record banks?
WY: Yes; one difference with HIEs relates to the privacy issue.
HIEs are trying to move information without consent, which causes
huge problems, and people do not understand that their data are
moving around without their consent. When they do, lawsuits
against HIEs arise, as they have in Rhode Island. But the critical
issue is stakeholder cooperation; HIEs depend on voluntary coop-
eration from the stakeholders, but they cannot be compelled to
provide information. By engaging the patient to request the infor-
mation, stakeholders are now forced to provide it, which enables
comprehensive information. Then, of course, there is the sustain-ability issue. HIEs are inherently more complex, cost more, and
are more difﬁcult to operate.
These are issues that are not going away, and these challenges
have led to the discouraging results we have seen with the HIEs
over many years. While it is certainly true that you can create a
mechanism to exchange data and you can create mechanisms for
point-to-point exchange, these do not by themselves solve the
problem of delivering comprehensive electronic patient records
at the point of care.
When I started working on Health Information Infrastructure at
HHS in 2002, the number of patients who got their care in the pres-
ence of their complete information was zero. Today, the number of
patients who get their care with complete information is still zero.
JH: You actually raise a very important point. In Massachusetts,
we have a state law called Chapter 305, which requires opt-in con-
sent to disclose data. So, in fact, we do not exchange data unless
there is patient consent ahead of time. The challenge, and what we
are building as phase two, is to record consent in a centralizedman-
ner, so that provider-to-provider exchange with a central consent
repository can be done more rapidly than the consumer-mediated
exchange.
LS: We are not talking about gross consent in these models; we
are talking about ﬁne-grained consent. You can have opt-out or a
check the box that is similar to gross consent because you do not
want to be bothered, but you can also be more active and you
can have more control. And you get the personal audit trail right
there of all the places the data went, even if you were not actively
engaged in the transfers.
Dr. Frisse says that 25 percent of the patients will often take ac-
tion in his study. So, we can set the same ﬂoor as we do for HIEs,
but for the 25 percent of the patients who want to be more actively
involved, we create an infrastructure for them to do so.
Attendee (Charles P. Friedman): How do you handle patient
identity?
JH: We have tried to constrain the problem a bit. How many
Mary Smiths are there in Massachusetts? Thousands. How many
Mary Smiths are there in a given provider’s practice? One or two.
So by doing provider-to-provider-directed exchange, you constrain
the number of matches of Mary Smith to a small number the pro-
vider has to look through. Probabilistic matching that looks at
name, gender, date of birth, Social Security number (which we can-
not use in Massachusetts), or other demographics, have proven to
be effective. The magic bullet, because we are still achieving sensi-
tivity and speciﬁcity of only 99 percent or so, is a voluntary opt-in
identiﬁer. We all know that President Clinton signed an executive
order actually preventing the U.S. from issuing a national health
care identiﬁer. So, in Massachusetts, we are seriously looking at
issuing a direct address as a voluntary opt-in identiﬁer for the pa-
tient, so that then when a provider-to-provider exchange occurs,
we can also send a copy to the patient with a known identiﬁer un-
ique to them.
WY: With all due respect to the Europeans, a national unique
identiﬁer is not needed to solve this problem. Such a unique iden-
tiﬁer is necessary to do provider-to-provider health information
exchange because you are drawing information from multiple
sources about patients who have to be matched in real time. With-
out that unique identiﬁer, the matching problem can not be solved.
But health record banks do not need to do that. Your credit
cards have numbers that uniquely identify you to your credit card
issuer, but are not nationally unique identiﬁers. The scope of those
identiﬁers is limited to the credit card company. If you lose a card,
they will invalidate that number and issue a new one. Health re-
cord banks would work the same way. The health record bank
has an account number for you. The scope of that account number
is only the health record bank. As data ﬂow into the health record
bank from various sources, an equivalence table is created
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tion. When a piece of information is received from a Mary Smith
and the bank can not ﬁgure out whose account it belongs in, it is
held. It is not deposited in real time in whichever account the
HRB thinks is the right one. Instead, human beings can call the pro-
vider, or even call Mary Smith, and ﬁgure out who she is and de-
posit her information into the right account. The deposits come
in when the information is created, so it is not necessary to assem-
ble the information in real time when it is needed.
One of the big advantages of health record banks is that a un-
ique identiﬁer is not needed. This is important because, in the Uni-
ted States, we are not likely to have such a unique identiﬁer any
time soon.
Attendee (Edward H. Shortliffe): I am a little concerned that it
may sound as though we are equating health record banks with
PHRs and the Microsoft and Google experience. It seems very clear
from many of the things Dr. Yasnoff said that there is an important
set of organizational distinctions in the ﬁnancial models and the
role of patients. That said, there may be an impression that the
health record bank notion is pretty abstract – a mental exercise.
Can you talk about real examples, either in the U.S. or abroad, of
HRBs being created and the experiences to date?
WY: There are four small health record banks operational in the
U.S. at this time, all in Washington State. A study of Health Infor-
mation Infrastructure in that state in 2006 [14] recommended
health record banks to solve the health information infrastructure
problem, and subsequent appropriations funded the development
of several pilots. One of those pilots at Madigan Army Medical Cen-
ter could solve the longstanding problem of DoD–VA connectivity.
If the DoD and VA health systems would just deposit information
about people into one place, they would not have to connect to
each other. Internationally, there is a health record bank being
developed in Rotterdam in The Netherlands, for all the reasons that
have been stated: to solve the privacy problem, to ensure compre-
hensive information, and to give people control over their
information.
If you survey consumers and ask them about consent, most con-
sumers believe that their information is only being used with con-
sent all the time. They believe that the HIPAA form that they sign at
their physician’s ofﬁce, which essentially notiﬁes them that they
have virtually no rights over their information and that it can be
used without consent for treatment, payment, and operations, is
actually a consent form. They presume that if they did not sign
it, then their information could not be used. Of course, that is to-
tally incorrect.
The real danger is that when consumers realize that all this ex-
change of health information is happening mostly without their
knowledge and consent, there will be a political backlash, much
like the one that occurred when the HIPAA law was enacted with
the requirement for each person to have a national unique identi-
ﬁer. When HIPAA was debated, there were hearings in the House
and the Senate, it was passed, the President signed it, and then
the public found out that there was going to include a unique iden-
tiﬁer. They said ‘‘no’’ to that; it was not a huge percentage of Amer-
icans complaining about it, but there was an outcry and the unique
identiﬁer requirement was rescinded.
I fear that same backlash if we continue on the HIE path and do
not give people the right to control their medical information in
the way that they had control from the founding of our nation until
2002 when the HIPAA privacy rule was ﬁnalized.
MF: I just need to reiterate that if there is a difference, it may be
just in what we choose to call an HIE or HIO. These capabilities have
evolved signiﬁcantly over the past few years and are now driven by
accountable care systems more consistent with Dr. Halamka’s
arguments. In every case, there needs to be a network or you are
out of business. I ﬁnd many of the criticisms of the ﬁrst generationRHIOs irrelevant to what I am doing today. I think it is important
that you decide for yourself whether that is the case.
JH: I did not mean to imply that Google or Microsoft Health-
Vault are fully mature health record banks. They were early exam-
ples of the sorts of features you would see that would evolve into a
health record bank. I think we should start with provider-directed
exchange and then add other products when they are ready.
LS: I disagree with that. It is very simple. If I had one one-hun-
dredth or one one-thousandth of the resources that have been put
into HIEs, it would be done without the need for HIEs.
Attendee: Is this technology particularly relevant for particular
patient groups?
LS: Almost before MyDataCan was announced, we had a long
list of companies who basically really believe that. I do not know
howmany of you know the governor in New Jersey who won based
on his weight loss. He blogged about it, and he had a huge number
of followers. Many companies have seen that as an inspirational
movement to change the status of health among group categories
of Americans. They want to do these contests and similar interven-
tions. A vehicle like MyDataCan becomes perfect for that. We may
actually see how again the data are used to change people’s lives
by putting it in a way that people can have access to it.
MF: I am all for empowerment. I think it is really exciting, but I
think to just focus on rights and preferences without focusing on
the transparency of how patients make informed decisions and
have some responsibility to public health and to their own cost, ex-
change is merely automating narcissism. You have to put it all in
one package – clinical, administrative, responsibility. Let us inform
people about every aspect of our health care system that impacts
the use of their personal health information.
JH: And our early experience in patient-family engagement is
that a consumer likes to afﬁliate with a provider and then can
ask the questions about their data to the provider, make appoint-
ments, renew prescriptions, and get referrals. So the idea of aggre-
gating data provider-to-provider and then sharing them with
patients and families and engaging them has worked well.
LS: I would just follow up on one thing, and that is what we
really do see with all of the companies. We have had a tremendous
volume of reaction to MyDataCan, more than we can process.
Whether it is from the research community or whether it is from
the commercial community, what I ﬁnd fascinating about all of it
is that it goes beyond the kind of vision that Dr. Halamka talked
about. It is not about provider to provider. It is about some other
group and your health data impacting your life. That is very pow-
erful and it is something that cannot be achieved only by keeping
the data locked among providers.
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